This study examines the extent and influence of occupational licensing in the U.S. using a specially designed national labor force survey. Specifically, we provide new ways of measuring occupational licensing and consider what types of regulatory requirements and what level of government oversight contribute to wage gains and variability. Estimates from the survey indicated that 35 percent of employees were either licensed or certified by the government, and that 29 percent were fully licensed. Another 3 percent stated that all who worked in their job would eventually be required to be certified or licensed, bringing the total that are or eventually must be licensed or certified by government to 38 percent. We find that licensing is associated with about 18 percent higher wages, but the effect of governmental certification on pay is much smaller. Licensing by larger political jurisdictions is associated with the higher wage gains relative to only local licensing. We find little association between licensing and the variance of wages, in contrast to unions. Overall, our results show that occupational licensing is an important labor market phenomenon that can be measured in labor force surveys.
Introduction
Occupational licensing as a topic in economics dates back at least to the comments by Adam Smith that trades conspire to reduce the availability of skilled craftsmen in order to raise wages (Smith, 1937) . The public policy and legal communities, however, have noted that regulating occupations in order to protect the public against incompetent, untrustworthy, or irresponsible practitioners is in the public interest (Thomas v. Collins, 1945) .
Since Friedman and Kuznets's (1945) classic work, there has been little analysis of the labor market influence of occupational regulation in economics (exceptions are Rottenberg, 1980; Kleiner, 2006; and Kleiner and Krueger, 2008) . 1 We use the results of a new telephone survey of the workforce conducted by Westat that asked detailed questions on occupational regulation as well as questions on the labor market status of individuals. The survey questions were developed as part of the Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII). These questions probe the kind of government regulation A major reason for the lack of empirical work has been the absence of national data that clearly defined whether a worker was regulated and the extent of regulation. The purpose of this study is to probe in greater detail the prospects for measuring occupational licensing in a new detailed labor force survey and to estimate the labor market effects of occupational licensing. Specifically, we delve into what types of regulatory requirements-and the particular level of government oversight-may contribute to wage gains and wage variability. required to perform a job, the process of becoming licensed, and the level of education and tests necessary to become licensed. Results of the Westat survey, as well as separate validation results from a Gallup survey, indicate that occupational licensing can be reasonably well measured in labor force surveys.
Turning to the substantive results, we find that licensing is associated with about 18percent higher wages, but government certification has a much smaller association with pay.
Licensing by larger and multiple political jurisdictions, such as regulation by the states and the federal government, is associated with higher wage gains than local regulations. Specific requirements by the government to enter an occupation, such as education level and long internships, are positively associated with wages. This pattern of results is consistent with a monopoly model of occupational licensing; where supply is more restricted if the licensing authority operates on a wider geographic level.
Background on Characteristics of Licensing
Occupational regulation in the United States generally takes three forms. The least restrictive form is registration, in which individuals file their names, addresses, and qualifications with a government agency before practicing their occupation. The registration process may include posting a bond or filing a fee. In contrast, certification permits any person to perform the relevant tasks, but the government-or sometimes a private, nonprofit agencyadministers an examination and certifies those who have achieved the level of skill and knowledge for certification. For example, travel agents and car mechanics are generally certified but not licensed. The toughest form of regulation is licensure; this form of regulation is often referred to as "the right to practice." Under licensure laws, working in an occupation for compensation without first meeting government standards is illegal. In 2003 the Council of State Governments estimated that more than 800 occupations were licensed in at least one state, and more than 1,100 occupations were licensed, certified, or registered (Council on Licensure,
Enforcement and Regulation [CLEAR], 2004).
Prior to our survey, the data available on occupational licensing in the U.S. was restricted to classifications as to whether various occupations were licensed at the state level, often based on the CLEAR data. These classifications could be linked to Census occupational employment data to derive estimates of the proportion of workers in licensed jobs. While informative, there are clear limitations of such data. First, compliance with state licensing requirements could be less than complete; some of these classified as working in licensed occupations may not in fact be licensed. Second, in some occupations there is a trial period when workers can work in a job before becoming licensed. Third, and probably most important, the state data miss licensing that takes place at the local and federal level.
Despite these serious limitations, the state-level data show some striking trends. During the early 1950s, less than 5 percent of the U.S. workforce was in occupations covered by licensing laws at the state level (Council of State Governments, 1952) . That number grew to almost 18 percent by the 1980s-with an even larger number if federal, city, and county occupational licensing is included. By 2000, the percentage of the workforce in occupations licensed by states was at least 20 percent, according to data gathered from the Department of Labor and the 2000 Census. In contrast, during this period no systematic attempts were made to gather information on licensing or its wage or employment effects at the federal or local level.
As employment in the United States shifted from manufacturing to service industries, which typically have lower union representation, the members of the occupations established a formal set of standards that governed members of the occupation. For a professional association, obtaining licensing legislation meant raising funds from members to lobby the state legislature, particularly the chairs of appropriate committees. In addition, the occupation association often solicits volunteers from its membership to work on legislative campaigns. With both financial contributions and volunteers, the occupational association has a significant ability to influence legislation and its administration, especially when opposition to regulatory legislation is absent or minimal (Wheelan, 1998) . The large potential gain from regulation through increased demand for the service, enhanced earnings, and the ability to restrict supply outweighs the potential losses to consumers of potentially higher prices for the regulated services. 
Wage Determination and Licensing: Background
A simple theory of occupational licensing suggests that there are simple mechanics or administrative procedures that drive supply and demand in the labor market. The planners screen entrants to the profession, barring those whose skills or character suggests a tendency toward low-quality output. The enforcers monitor incumbents and discipline, those whose performance is below standards, with punishments that may include revocation of the license needed to practice. Assuming that entry and ongoing performance are controlled in these ways by the planner, the quality of service in the profession will almost always be maintained at or above standards.
The economic implications of this mechanical model notes that supply shifts up because of increased costs of entering an occupation due to education and other training requirements such as the greater time, effort and financial costs imposed to enter the market. Further, a lower bound is established due to testing and education requirements and the implications that these would be a key discipline on incumbents-the threat of loss of license. Additional costs could include imposition of fines, improved screening to prevent expelled practitioners from reentering the occupation, or requiring all incumbents to put up capital that would be forfeited upon loss of the license. To offset the possibility that incumbents could shift to other occupations with little loss of income, entry requirements could be tightened to limit supply and create monopoly rents within the licensed occupation. The threat of losing these monopoly rents could, in principle,
give incentives to incumbents to maintain standards. The rents also could motivate potential entrants to invest in high levels of training in order to gain admittance. This suggests that licensing can raise quality within an industry by restricting supply and raising prices.
Demand could increase due to higher perceived actual quality and lower risk, but might also decrease for some if there is heterogeneous labor demand and licensing decreases differentiation in offered services (Shapiro, 1986) . Further the passage of tougher regulations not only raises providers' costs but also shifts out the demand for their services by enhancing consumers'
confidence that these services are of good quality. An outward shift in demand would accentuate the increase in the price of services, boosting provider incomes. Modeling of licensing shows that consumers can choose among three markets: a market for mature producers known to sell high-quality services, a market for mature producers known to produce low-quality services, and a market for young producers whose quality of service (low or high) is not known by the consumer at time of purchase (Shapiro, 1986) . The result is that seekers of high quality services gain by regulation relative to low quality markets were prices are higher and choices more limited.
Unlike unions, which can engage in concerted activities such as strikes or work slowdowns, licensed workers do not sign collective agreements with their employers. Nor do they engage in strikes against employers to raise wages. Occupational licensing can affect pay and employment through three main channels. First, licensing may increase quality by imposing initial education, testing, continuing training requirements, internship requirements, or fees.
These requirements are likely to diminish the number of less qualified or unmotivated individuals who could enter the occupation, and thereby serve to drive up the average quality of workers in an occupation. A consequence is higher quality outcomes for those who are able to obtain the service, but fewer practitioners and less access to the service.
Second, by using the state to monitor and prevent the potential work effort of unlicensed workers, competition by unlicensed individuals is virtually eliminated through the use of the state's enforcement powers. For example, the work of "hair braiders," which is unlicensed, could be brought under the control of the cosmetology board and limited to only licensed cosmetologists or barbers (Anderson v. Minnesota Board of Barber and Cosmetology Examiners, 2005) . Further, when demand fluctuates for traditional tasks, the board has the ability to expand the regulated work through establishing administrative rules and limiting the work of unregulated workers. Third, the regulatory board through its administrative procedures of establishing large entry barriers and moral suasion can reduce the number of openings in schools that prepare individuals for licensed positions. In addition, by adjusting the pass rate on the licensing exam, they can change the number of new entrants from instate or migrants from other states or nations (Tenn, 2001 , Pagliero, 2009 (Kleiner, 2006) . Using controls for state characteristics, the multivariate estimates showed that in the states where the occupations were unlicensed there was a 20 percent faster growth rate than in states that did license these occupations. Another study found that the imposition of greater licensing requirements for funeral directors is associated with fewer women holding jobs as funeral directors relative to men by 18 to 24 percent (Cathles, Harrington, and Krynski, 2009 ).
Studies of the effects of licensing on wages have, in many ways, paralleled the research methods used to study the effect of unions on wages (Lewis, 1986) . These approaches include Although the survey response rate is low compared to many government labor force surveys, it is comparable to that in commercial surveys. While the low response rate is potentially worrisome, Groves and Peytcheva (2008) show that survey nonresponse rates by themselves are not necessarily associated with significant bias. Low response rates are a concern when the causes of participation in the survey are correlated with the survey variables of interest.
We suspect that occupational licensing is not strongly associated with the tendency to complete the survey. The response rate was low in large part because many households declined to participate in the screener questions, which did not mention occupational licensing. Another reason for placing some confidence in the representativeness of our sample is that a standard
Mincerian wage regression using data from the survey closely matched the corresponding regression from the CPS (see the Appendix). Although we would have preferred a higher response rate, we have no reason to believe that nonresponse skews our results in favor of finding more or less occupational licensing and certification, or particular associations between licensing and certification and earnings.
Westat developed survey weights to compensate for variation in selection probabilities, differential response rates, and possible under coverage of the sampling frame. 
Questionnaire and Data
As a further example of the reliability of our sample, all the physicians said they were licensed.
We designed a module to assess the accuracy of self-reported occupational licensing and certification. The key questions were as follows: (Kleiner and Krueger, 2008) . Using another approach through the use of Census data in 2000, about 20 percent of workers were licensed only at the state level, which is consistent with our estimates in the PDII (Kleiner, 2006) . These independent talleys provide further confirmation of the reliability of the survey estimates in the PDII
Who Is Licensed?
To explore the basic demographic and economic characteristics of regulated workers, we examine the distribution of licensed occupations by education, race, union status, public or private sector, and gender in Table 2 . The results indicate that licensing rises with education: more than 40 percent of those with post college education are required to have a license compared to only 15 percent for those with less than a high school education. The results in the Table show that union members are more likely to be licensed, reflecting in part the large number of teachers and nurses who tend to be more union members and licensed more often than workers in the labor market. Government workers are more likely to have a license than nongovernment workers, but there is no difference in the rate of licensing by gender.
We find similar licensing rates for men and women, whites, blacks, and Hispanics. The table also shows that licensing rises with age and then declines slightly over age 54. Table 2 also presents further the distribution by industry and union status. Licensing is also much more prevalent for those who provide services or repair items than those who make things on their jobs.
The questionnaire also asked questions about the governmental level of licensing for the individuals in our sample. In our survey about two-thirds of the licensed individuals in our sample are licensed at the state level, followed by the federal and local levels. In general occupations commonly required to have state licenses range from attorneys and dentists to dental hygienists and mortgage brokers. Individuals who usually are federally licensed workers range from workers such as quality assurance inspectors for the Federal Aviation Administration to stockbrokers. At the local level, taxi drivers and massage therapists are often licensed by this political jurisdiction. The federal courts have largely left licensing as a state issue, since this is the level of government that has largely regulated workers in the United States (Dent v. West Virginia, 1888) . Nevertheless, the courts have determined that licensing by the states can contradict the Sherman Act (Goldfarb v. Virginia, 1975) . The Supreme Court ruled that the state attorney bar association's policy of a minimum fee schedule violated the Sherman Act's prohibition of combinations in restraint of trade. The Court ruled that the legal profession was not a public service, but rather a market-driven service. These court decisions have made the focus of most licensing as largely a state legal and economic policy issue rather than a federal or local issue.
The requirements necessary to enter an occupation potentially influence the quality of services rendered and serve as a barrier to entry. Table 3 gives the percentage of licensed workers from our survey data that require a college education, a high school education or GED, an internship or apprenticeship, passage of a test, demonstration of qualifications, fees, continuing education, and continued testing to maintain a license. For example, 85 percent of those persons licensed were required to take an exam, almost 70 percent were required to take continuing education classes, more than half require an internship, and almost 43 percent require at least a college education. Each of the requirements can enhance the quality of the practitioners in the occupation or restrict entry and thereby reduce competition for performing the work. In panel B of the table we show percentage distribution of political jurisdictions of licensed individuals in our sample. The sample was restricted to persons who had no missing information for each of the jurisdictional variables. This gives a sample of 2,449 in which 33.2% of the workers were licensed or certified. In the entire sample of 2,504, we have 34.6% licensed or certified.
Occupational Regulation and Wages
To examine whether licensing is associated with higher pay, we present estimates of log wage regressions in the estimated model in Table 4 . 8 We augment a standard earnings equation to include a dummy variable indicating whether a license is required for the worker's job. We regard these estimates as mainly descriptive, since licensed workers may differ from unlicensed workers in unobserved ways, even after we condition on education and and two digit occupation.
If a dummy variable indicating license status is added to a standard wage equation, having a license is associated with approximately 18 percent higher hourly (p-value < 0.001) 9 . 10 The cross-sectional effect of licensing is similar in magnitude to the estimated effect of belonging to a union (see Lewis, 1986) , and greater than an additional year of schooling 11 . The regression estimates also include educational attainment, age, self employment, career experience and its square, union status, and industry and occupation dummy variables.
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A distinguishing characteristic of the Westat survey is that the variable for career experience is the reported actual experience of the respondents rather than an estimate based on age and education (Blau and Kahn, 2008) . Specifically, the question for experience was: "Since age 18, in how many years altogether have you worked for pay or profit? Please count all years in which you worked either all or part of the year." The variable tracked well the traditional variable for experience used in human capital analysis. A major policy issue for the governmental regulation of occupations is the role for certification, which allows others to do the work but allows individuals to earn a title that signifies that they achieved certain requirements.
Unlike licensing, for certification there are no restrictions other than titling for doing the task for pay.
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In order to further probe potential issues of selectivity bias for the licensing variable we implemented the implied ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005) . We find that if there is no causal relationship between licensing and wages, then the positive OLS estimate ( �) is explained by correlation between the licensing
In Table 5 we estimate wage equations similar to those in Table 4 using largely the same covariates but add an indicator for certification status. We find that the certification variable, although positive, is not statistically significant and the coefficients are of a much smaller in magnitude than was found for licensing, averaging about 8percent. Specifications with no controls for occupation and estimates with four digit occupational controls were specified and produced precisely estimated coefficients for the licensing coefficients, and were of similar magnitude. The results of these wage equations are consistent with the interpretation that licensing policy enables the individuals in a licensed job to obtain a degree of monopoly control, or the ability to "fence out" competitors for a service, which results in increased wages for licensed workers. Licensing policies, with regulations that require additional effort to get into the occupation, matter more in wage determination than the government merely giving its approval of a title for an occupation.
dummy and the error term that is 2/5 times the correlation between the observables and the licensing dummy. The relative relationship between the licensing dummy and unobservables such as ability and effort would have to be at least as large as this value to suggest that the true licensing causal effect is zero
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To further probe the role of occupational licensing, we next examine whether the level of governmental jurisdiction that issues occupational licenses matters for wage determination.
Specifically, as shown in Table 6 , we allow for a differential effect of licensing at the county or city, state, or federal level. In our sample, 49 percent of the respondents reported that they were licensed at only one level of government, while the others reported that they had licenses from more than one governmental venue. A basis of comparison in our estimates is individuals who do not need a license for their jobs. One category also is for persons who have a license but do not use it for their job. For example, a manager in a large firm may be a licensed attorney, but his or her license is not required for the position. Our estimates are intended to examine the influence of having one or multiple jurisdictional levels of licensure on wages. Overall, licensing at the state level is associated with the largest and most consistent effect on wages. As shown in the first row of Our results show the largest influence of the level of government licensing on wages is greatest at the state and federal levels. Local licenses are not associated with pay increases.
. Further, the interaction of state with either federal or local government levels of regulation is precisely estimated with coefficient estimates of about 25 percent.
14 The implied ratio for the equations in Table 4 and 5 were estimated as implied ratio =
.The implied rated was .395 for the � in Table 4 and .397 in equation 5. 15 Estimates with no occupational controls and those with four digit SOC controls produced precisely estimated coefficient values for the licensing variables, but with varying magnitudes.
Potential reasons for the decline in the precision of the estimates for licensing at the local level may be that licensing for low-paid jobs, such as taxi licenses and tattoo parlors, are often left to local governments. Further, local licensing is less likely to be a restriction on competition than state or federal licensing which covers a larger geographic area, since customers can call a taxi from an unlicensed jurisdiction at an airport or home, or visit a neighboring town for a tattoo.
Based on these estimates, we conclude that licensing is a labor market institution that matters in wage determination at least as much unionization.
Probing the Anatomy of Wage Effects
What elements of licensing requirements contribute to the wage advantage captured by licensed practitioners? In Table 7 we probe the provisions of licensing regulations that enhance the wage premium of regulated practitioners. In order to obtain a license, individuals in occupations often are required to meet general education requirements that include graduation from high school or college, and occupation-specific requirements such as a long internship, some lasting more than a year, and attending continuing education classes following entry into the field. In addition, for entry into an occupation, passing an examination is generally required.
The effects of testing for entry is an issue that has been raised by Milton Friedman and others, who hypothesized and provided evidence that the members of the occupation can manipulate the pass rate to restrict entry and raise wages (Friedman, 1962; Maurizi, 1974; Kleiner and Kudrle, 2000; and Kleiner, 2006) . Our results show that licensing enhances earnings but that the individual provisions such as testing, education and fees do not produce an additive impact.
None of the other specific requirements are robust in their statistical significance across all specifications; and, the requirements together are not significant at the p-value < 0.01 using an Ftest for the joint significance of the requirements to obtain and maintain a license in the specifications in the table. It appears that the additional requirements beyond becoming licensed do not contribute to enhanced wages.
Job Tasks of Regulated Practitioners
Do licensed occupations perform more sophisticated cognitive work tasks, such as doing difficult math and reading assignments? If so, perhaps the wage premium is economic returns to higher cognitive abilities and tasks. Moreover, are licensed or government-certified tasks more education-intensive, which would account for some of the wage premium obtained by regulated workers? In order to address this question using the data from the PDII survey, we examine question 25, which asks the self-reported use of math and reading abilities of the practitioners.
For example, the reading question asks: "What (is/was) the longest document that you typically read as part of your job?" And the math question asks: "How often (do/did) you solve problems at your jobs using advanced mathematics such as algebra, geometry, trigonometry, probability, or calculus?" In Appendix 3 we show the use of these skills by licensure and certification status.
16 Table 8 analyzes reading utilization, and Table 9 examines math use when occupational regulation is taken into account. The estimates in these tables show that regulated practitioners are somewhat more likely to do more reading tasks at their workplace, controlling for standard human capital, demographic, and occupation variables that are available in the survey. Although licensed workers have a positive, albeit small, impact on reading use, certified workers, such as librarians and technicians, are much more likely to engage in detailed reading relative to either unregulated or licensed practitioners. Table 9 shows that regulated occupations do more math-related tasks. Although licensed occupations appear to do somewhat more work that requires cognitive tasks, the results of the influence of occupational regulation vary when the detailed occupations are included.
Does Licensing Influence Wage Dispersion?
In order to examine the influence of licensing on the variance in wages, we examine the mean within category squared residual from a log of wage regressions in both licensed and unlicensed occupations, controlling for human capital characteristics. We also compare union and nonunion earnings as a point of reference, since unions have been shown to reduce variations in wages (Card 1996) 17 17 Estimates of a more traditional wage dispersion approach using only two groups found similar results (Freeman, 1982) .
. Table 10 presents observations that are split into quartiles on the basis of predicted wage in the unlicensed sector. The observation numbers are not equal in each quartile because of missing values of wages, and the same procedure is used to estimate differences in the union and nonunion sector. The mean log wage and standard deviation of the log wage is calculated within each quartile to show how different parts of the wage distribution are affected by either licensing or unions. The mean wage of licensed and union workers is statistically significantly higher than their corresponding unlicensed and nonunion workers at each quartile.
The measure of dispersion of wages among licensed jobs is about the same as unregulated ones, and the p-value for difference in the standard errors is not significant for all four earnings categories and for the overall measure of dispersion. In contrast, the upper part of the table shows that unionization reduces the variance in for the second and third quartile of wages, and is significant for the overall measure of dispersion where the sample size is the largest. These results are similar to those found with a different data set in Kleiner and Krueger (2008) , suggesting the robustness of the findings for the role of unions and licensing over time and across different surveys.
Conclusions
We show that occupational licensing is an important labor market phenomenon that is pervasive and likely has a large influence on wage determination. Using a specially designed survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans carried out by Westat, we provide an examination of the prevalence and influence of various forms of occupational licensing. We
show that the consistency of reporting in having a license is high, but that it is more difficult to externally verify licensing through government databases, in part due to the lack of on-line or computer-readable data of licensed practitioners by states and local governments.
Licensing is a growing phenomenon in the U.S. economy, reaching almost 29 percent of workers in our 2008 survey. Workers who have higher levels of education are more likely to work in jobs that require a license, and most licensing is implemented at the state level. The requirement of government regulation, especially regulation at both the state and local level or the state and federal level, is associated with higher wages relative to those in jobs that only require local licensing. Certification, a weaker form of government regulation that allows others (noncertified workers) to work in the occupation, has a much smaller effect on wages. Workers who are licensed or certified do work that is associated with greater use of reading and somewhat more use of mathematical tasks. Unlike unions, which appear to reduce wage variation, licensing does not appear to diminish wage variation.
On balance, our results also lend support for the interpretation that occupational licensing serves as a means to enforce entry barriers to a profession that raise wages. Furthermore, our finding that licensing is associated with a larger wage premium when the license is issued at the state as opposed to local level suggests that competition is more effectively restricted when there is no possibility of obtaining a service from an unlicensed provider in a nearby locality. Our estimates of the relationship of occupational licensing and wages is consistent with the hypothesized role by members of an occupation to raise wages by using the powers of government to drive up requirements and capture work for the regulated workers for larger geographic areas. These estimates suggest a strong role for the monopoly face of licensing in the labor market. Indeed, the wage premium associated with licensing is strikingly similar to that found in studies of the effect of unions on wages (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, Lewis, 1986) . It 
